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1. Introduction
In this paper we contribute to the understanding of compensation practices in consumer
cooperatives — a particular form of non-profit organizations — and try to shed some light on
the dierences to their for-profit rivals. In particular, we provide a reason why a consumer
cooperative (henceforth Coop) might be less prone than a profit-maximizing firm (hence-
forth PMF) to pay variable bonuses to its manager, relying on a straight salary instead.1
Coops are enterprises operating in the retail industry which, by law or statutory rules, act
on behalf of their consumer-members. Since, ultimately, customers are the main Coop’s
stakeholders, they are commonly entitled to democratically elect their representatives, who
participate in general meetings and, directly or indirectly — usually through a board of direc-
tors — recruit the CEOs running the firm. The wide diusion of Coops worldwide suggests
that this form of organizational governance is not a negligible phenomenon. In 2008 more
than 3,000 Coops were active in Europe with a turnover of approximately 70 billion Euro
and 25 million consumer-members (EuroCoop 2008). Also Japan reports a very large num-
ber of consumer cooperatives, serving 25.8 million members and producing a turnover of
approximately 30 billion Euro in 2009 (JCCU, 2009). Switzerland, Finland, Italy, Spain, as
well as many other European countries similarly possess well-established consumer cooper-
ative movements. In recent years, the scale of operations of this type of firms has reached a
considerable dimension and most of existing Coops can be currently portrayed as enterprises
competing oligopolistically with conventional PMFs, thus giving rise to a special form of
mixed oligopoly.2
The principal-agent relationship between Coop members, its board of directors, and the
manager of the firm has been discussed quite intensively in the literature on Coop corpo-
rate governance (see e.g. Spear 2004, Nilsson 2001, Cornforth 2004, Sykuta and Cook 2001,
Richards et al. 1998). Concerning CEO compensation, empirical work has repeatedly shown
that — in contrast to a PMF — Coops avoid providing high-powered incentives to their man-
agers. For example, Hueth and Marcoul (2009) find that "... the cooperative governance
structure is likely to result in less reliance on explicit performance incentives." (p. 1220).
Instead, Coops rely to a much higher degree on monitoring, implicit contracts (enforced by
social ties between the CEO and board members) and subjective performance evaluation (see
also Ittner et al. 2007). Colter and Nolan (2006) find that compensation in Coops is mainly
related to the size of the Coop and that contingent pay and bonuses are uncommon and
small compared to the base salary. Colter (2011) remarks that, "..there are managers who
much prefer to have not a bonus at all." Trechter and King (1995) discover that bonuses
of Coop managers were mainly related to size measures like sales or total assets and less
dependent on profitability. Trechter et al. (1997) report that Coop boards are skeptical of
ex ante bonus programs. The empirical findings for CEO compensation in Coops are in line
with the findings for other non-profit organizations, see e.g. Frumkin and Keating (2010),
1Note that our results in this paper also apply to agriculture cooperatives when competing with PMFs in
selling inputs to farmers, who, therefore, act as consumers.
2In contrast with this evidence, over the last decades the economic literature has mainly focused on a
Coop’s behavior under monopoly, perfect competition, or monopolistic competition. The classical contri-
butions by Bekenstein (1943), Enke (1945), Yamey (1950), Anderson, Maurice, and Porter (1979, 1980),
Ireland and Law (1983), Sexton (1983, 1990), Sexton and Sexton (1987), Farrell (1985) and, more recently,
Hart and Moore (1996, 1998) and Mikami (2003, 2010), all adopt modelling approaches in which strategic
interaction does not play any role.
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Brandl and Güttel (2007), and Hallock (2002). To understand these observations, two main
reasons have been advanced. First, from an agency perspective, using low-powered incentives
for the managers in NPOs is the board’s optimal response since the objectives are di!cult
to quantify (Hallock 2002, Preyra and Pink 2001). Since the goals are vague and ill-defined
and the danger of giving dysfunctional incentives is high, the use of pay-for-performance
is restricted (Theuvsen 2004, Spear 2004). Additionally, in Coops the heterogeneity across
members makes it di!cult to agree on performance targets, which results in low-powered
incentives for CEOs (Hueth and Marcoul 2009). Second, from a management perspective,
using low-powered incentives is indicated since pay-for-performance based on financial mea-
sures does not fit with a non-profit’s mission (Frumkin and Keating 2010). Strong extrinsic
financial incentives are against the principle of fairness and might crowd out intrinsic moti-
vation of individuals who have (been) selected to work in a non-profit organization (Spear
2004, Theuvsen 2004).
We believe that, although important, any explanation for low-powered incentives in Coops
(and other nonprofit organizations for that matter) which is based only on these two per-
spectives provides an incomplete description of the governance and behavior of organizations
competing in oligopolistic markets. The argument which we pursue in this paper is that prod-
uct market competition and strategic interaction between firms shape incentive contracts and
governance as well. In the last years, several empirical papers have shown that this inter-
action plays an important role (e.g. Karuna 2007, Cunat and Guadalupe 2005, Vroom and
Gimeno 2007). Furthermore, the literature on strategic incentives (e.g. Sengul et al. 2012,
Kopel and Lö"er 2012, Kopel and Lö"er 2008) has demonstrated how incentive contracts
for managers or, more general, organizational governance can be used as a strategic device
to obtain a competitive advantage and market leadership.3 Therefore, the question remains
why Coops would not want to use higher-powered incentive contracts to guide their man-
agers’ market behavior and to influence their rivals’ expectations in oligopolistic interaction,
but rather use straight salaries and rely on implicit contracts and subjective performance
evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, no formal work has addressed this strategic incen-
tive issue. The only work worth mentioning is Feng and Hendrickse (2011), who introduce
a multi-tasking agency model and argue that Coops might have e!ciency advantages if
interdependencies between upstream and downstream activities exist. At the end of their
paper, they only briefly address strategic incentive eects, but provide no detailed analysis
(see, similarly, Feng and Hendrickse 2009). In the present paper, we close this gap in the
literature and analyze a strategic incentives game between a PMF and a Coop.
More precisely, we consider a Coop and a PMF interacting in a Bertrand duopoly with
dierentiated goods (e.g. Marini and Zevi 2011, Drivas and Giannakas 2010, Giannakas
and Fulton 2005, Fulton and Giannakas 2001). Both, the Coop and the PMF, delegate
the price choice to managers. Following the strategic incentives literature, we assume that
each manager’s compensation is determined by an explicit performance contract based on
observable and verifiable performance measures, in our case profits and sales revenues.4 The
owners of the firm (or the board) can design the manager’s contract to obtain a competitive
3See also the classic references, Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Vickers (1985).
4Our setting could be equivalently interpreted in a dierent way, namely that the owners can select the
type of manager, who is either interested in performance measures like sales revenue and profit or whose
preferences are in line with the firm’s objectives (e.g. Vickers 1985 and, for the managerial preference
approach, e.g. Williamson 1963). Using this interpretation, our paper contributes to a better understanding
of the issue of matching of manager types for Co-ops in mixed markets.
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advantage in this situation of strategic interaction. Following the evidence above, we also
assume that the Coop can abstain from oering a bonus contract to its manager and use a
straight salary for compensation instead. In this case, the Coop relies on monitoring and
implicit contracts to ensure that the Coop’s objective function is maximized.5 What we
find is in line with empirical and anecdotal evidence. In equilibrium, the PMF owners oer
their manager a bonus incentive contract. In contrast, the owners of the Coop find it more
beneficial in terms of member value not to use high-powered incentives via a profit-and-
sales based incentive contract, but instead compensate the manager using a straight salary.
Summarizing, our model shows that if one focuses on the strategic impact, it is not indicated
for a Coop to use the same type of compensation for its manager as a PMF. The intuition is
that a Coop, due to its focus on consumers’ preferences, is per se highly expansionary in term
of output and, therefore, does not need to rely on a manager who sets prices aggressively to
expand market share and quantity. Furthermore, employing a manager who is interested in
sales and profit leads to distorted incentives with respect to the Coop’s goal, which after all
is the welfare of its members.
Summarizing, our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we start from micro-
economic fundamentals and endogenously derive a consumer Coop’s objective function. This
is worth pointing out since in existing work on Coop behavior a variety of exogenously given
objectives have been considered (see the comprehensive survey by Soboh et al. 2009). How-
ever, the objective function of a firm should be endogenously derived (see Kelsey and Milne
2008, Eldenburg et al. 2004, Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). Second, we show that Coops do
not have strategic reasons to use incentive contracts. This is of interest in the light of some
recent trends in Coop management. For example, a research report of the Center of Coop-
eratives (see Lang 2002) based on responses of industry experts concluded that: "[e]xisting
compensation programs are not seen as adequate to attract chief executives comparable to
those of investor-oriented firms.", and, "Cooperative management must have compensation
programs adequate to attract chief executives comparable to those of investor-owned firms."
(p. 27). New generation Cooperatives and other hybrid organizational structures emerge
and are competing head-to-head with profit-maximizing rival firms (Katz and Boland 2002,
Kopel and Brand 2012), and therefore consider providing high-powered incentives to their
managers as well. Third, our paper complements a line of research which considers strategic
incentives in mixed oligopolies with a public firm or hybrid organizational structures (e.g.
Kopel and Brand 2012, Barcena-Ruiz 2009, Heywood and Ye 2009, Goering 2007, 2008, and
White 2001).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces a mixed duopoly model in
which a Coop and a PMF compete in prices and supply dierentiated goods to consumers.
The two firms delegate the choice of prices and determine the optimal compensation struc-
ture. Section 3 presents the main results of our paper. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
There are two goods, which are assumed to be provided by two heterogeneous firms com-
peting strategically in prices: one PMF selling good l and one Coop selling good m. Both
5Since we want to focus exclusively on the question if it is beneficial for the firms to use incentive contracts
for strategic reasons, we abstract from the risk-incentive trade-o under moral hazard or congruency issues
in multi-tasking agency settings. However, as Fershtman and Judd (1987, 1990) demonstrate, strategic
concerns are important even under moral hazard.
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firms bear an identical unit cost f, so that cost functions are given by c({n) = f{n> n = l> m.
We assume a continuum of identical consumers k R i> with i = [0> 1], possessing quasi-linear
preferences over two symmetrically dierentiated goods and a numeraire denoted by |.6 For
each k-th consumer, preferences are expressed by the following quadratic utility function
uk : R3+ A R+
(2.1) uk
¡
{kl > {
k
m > |
k
¢
= +({kl + {
k
m ) 
1
2
(({kl )
2 + ({km )
2) {kl {
k
m + |
k
where {kn, for n = l> m denotes the individual consumption of the n-th good, and  R [0> 1)
the degree of product dierentiation (e.g. Singh and Vives, 1984). Total quantities of the
two products are denoted by {l and {m. If the available income of each consumer (denoted
|k) is su!ciently high, the inverse demands for both goods can be obtained by aggregating
all consumers’ first-order conditions for the maximization of (2.1) subject to their individual
budget constraint
(2.2) sl ({l> {m){kl + sm ({l> {m){
k
m + |
k  |k=
Here sl ({l> {m) and sm ({l> {m) denote the prices of the two goods. Carrying out this derivation
in the usual way yields the following inverse demand functions
sl ({l> {m) = + {l  {m>(2.3)
sm ({l> {m) = + {m  {l=
The direct demand system can be obtained by inverting (2.3) and writes as
{l(sl> sm) =
+
1 + 
 
1
1 2
sl +

1 2
sm(2.4)
{m(sl> sm) =
+
1 + 
 
1
1 2
sm +

1 2
sl=
The starting point for the endogenous derivation of the Coop objective function is that
every consumer is assumed to receive a part of the Coop net profit proportional to this
consumer’s share of the good purchased. In consumer cooperatives this share usually takes
the form of a patronage rebate paid on the members’ purchases. Since in our model the Coop
is assumed to act on behalf of all potential consumers of its products, it maximizes the joint
utility of all its consumer-members subject to their budget constraints. As is shown below,
by aggregating for all consumers, the objective function corresponds to the maximization of
total consumer welfare subject to the collective budget constraint (see also Marini and Zevi,
2011). More formally, at an interior solution where all consumers k R i are served by the
two firms, we have
max
sm
Z
kMi
uk
¡
{kl (sl> sm) > {
k
m (sl> sm) > |
k
¢
gk s.t.
P
n=m>l
sn
Z
kMi
{kn (sl> sm) gk+
Z
kMi
|kgk 
Z
kMi
|kgk+
Z
kMi
{km (sl>sm)gk
{m(sl>sm)
[sm{m (sl> sm) cm ({m (sl> sm))]
6Some of our results will be shown to hold in a more general setting for any quasilinear consumer
preferences.
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Since in equilibrium the budget constraint is binding and the consumers have a mass of 1,
this implies
max
sm
u ({l (sl> sm) > {m (sl> sm)) + | s.t.
P
n=m>l
sn{n (sl> sm) + | = | + [sm{m (sl> sm) cm ({m (sl> sm))] >
with
u(sl> sm) = (+ ({l (p) + {m (p)) (1@2) ({
2
l (p) + {
2
m (p)) {l (p){m (p) >
and p =(sl> sm).
This optimization problem can be simplified as
(2.5) max
sm
v (sl> sm) = max
sm
{u(p) + |  sl{l((p)) cm ({m (p))} >
and by (2.1) and the linear cost specification, (2.5) simply becomes:
(2.6)
max
sm
©
+ ({l(p) + {m(p)) (1@2) ({
2
l (p) + {
2
m(p)) {l(p){m(p) + |  sl{l(p) f{m(p)
ª
=
Hence, the constrained optimization problem of the Coop can be transformed into an uncon-
strained optimization problem with objective function (2.6).7 In this paper, we will assume
that the owners of the Coop make their decisions in order to maximize (2.6).
Concerning the PMF, we assume, as usual, that the owners pursue to maximize profit, i.e.
(2.7) max
sl
 = (sl  f){l(sl> sm)=
We assume that both firms delegate the choice of prices to their managers. Following the
standard delegation model (e.g. Fershtman and Judd 1987, Sklivas 1987, Vickers 1985), we
assume that the manager of the PMF is compensated on the basis of profits l = sl{l cl({l)
and revenues rl = sl{l.8 Likewise, the manager of the Coop can be compensated based on
the Coop’s profit m and sales revenue rm.9 Alternatively, the Coop can use a straight salary
to compensate its manager and rely on other incentive measures to ensure goal alignment
between the Coop and its manager. In particular, the managers’ compensation is given by
ul = al +bl[ll + (1 l)rl](2.8)
um = am +bm[mm + (1 m)rm]=
In case of profit-and-sales-based contracts, the incentive parameter n is chosen endogenously
7For simplicity, in what follows we disregard the constant |, since its particular value does not aect the
equilibrium analysis. Notice that the objective function of a Coop corresponds to the objective of a publicly-
owned firm competing with a foreign firm in a dierentiated market. In a market with foreign competition,
the public firm is assumed to maximize the consumers’ surplus in both markets plus the producer surplus
(profit) of only the domestic firm (see, for instance, Ohnishi 2010, Fernandez-Ruiz 2009, or Benabess 2011).
8Note that it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for a PMF to write such an incentive contract. That is, no
matter what the other firm chooses, a PMF would never prefer to oer its manager a straight salary.
9The rationale for using such observable and verifiable indicators is, in general, that it may be rather
di!cult to base compensation schemes on more sophisticated performance measure involving members’
"utility". See Barros (1995) or White (2001) for similar arguments in the context of public firms.
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by each firm’s owners as part of the contract design. Further, an denotes the fixed salary
component of the contract and bn the weight which is put on the manager’s variable com-
pensation component. For n = 1, the contract is profit-based and for n = 0 the contract
is sales revenue-based. In case of a straight salary, the Coop sets bm = 0. It is important to
note, that the compensation parameters an and bn are just chosen to fulfill the manager’s
reservation constraint un  u (the reservation utility u is obtained if the manager accepts
a job outside the firm), and only the part in the brackets is relevant for providing incentives
to the manager. A manager will accept the contract if the reservation constraint is fulfilled.
For notational simplicity, we set u = 0, but note that this assumption does not alter our
results in any way.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the first stage, the Coop determines the compen-
sation structure, either a straight salary or an incentive contract. In case incentive contracts
are chosen, both firms determine the contract design, i.e. the optimal values of the fixed and
incentive components of the corresponding contract, to maximize its own objective function,
which is (2.7) for the PMF and (2.6) for the Coop. In case the Coop chooses a straight
salary, only the PMF chooses the contract parameters. At the third and final stage, the
firms’ managers will set the prices such that the manager’s compensation is maximized, tak-
ing the strategic interaction with the rival firm into account. If the Coop’s manager receives
a fixed salary, we assume that prices are chosen to maximize (2.6). The main question which
we will study with this model is if the Coop owners have a strategic reason to use an explicit
incentive contract. All dierences in the compensation structure — e.g. more reliance on
fixed components and less weight on variable compensation — will emerge endogenously as a
result of the dierent governance modes and the strategic interaction of the two firms in the
market. Moreover, assuming identical incentive contracts in PMFs and Coops enables us
to compare the structures of the optimal compensation contracts of the two organizational
modes.
3. Main Results
We organize our results in two dierent subsections corresponding to the two dierent sub-
games we want to analyze. We solve each subgame by backward induction and subsequently
determine the optimal decision taken by the Coop at stage one.
3.1. Only the PMF uses an incentive contract. It is helpful to start the analysis with
the subgame in which only the PMF uses a strategic incentive contract, whereas the Coop
relies on a straight salary. For this subgame, we can prove that, under consumers’ quasilinear
preferences and price competition, in equilibrium a Coop will always set a price equal to its
marginal cost.
Proposition 1. If the Coop manager is compensated by a straight salary, in equilibrium the
manager will always set a price equal to marginal costs.
Proof. According to our results in the previous subsection (see (2.6)), the objective function
of the Coop takes the general form of
v ({l(sl> sm)> {m(sl> sm)) = u({l(sl> sm)> {m(sl> sm)) + |  sl{l(sl> sm) cm({m(sl> sm))=
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Since the manager in this case determines the price to maximize v , the FOC for an interior
solution is given by
(3.1)
gv ({l(sl> sm)> {m(sl> sm))
gsm
=
Cu
C{l
C{l
Csm
+
Cu
C{m
C{m
Csm
 sl
C{l
Csm
 
Ccm
C{m
C{m
Csm
= 0=
Since, under quasilinear preferences
Cu
C{n
= sn> for n = l> m>
expression (3.1) can be written as
(3.2)
gv ({l(sl> sm)> {m(sl> sm))
gsm
= (
Cu
C{m
 
Ccm
C{m
)
C{m
Csm
= 0=
Given that C{m (sl> sm) @Csm ? 0, condition (3.2) implies
Cu
C{m
=
Ccm
C{m
=
¤
The meaning of Proposition 1 is that the Coop manager will naturally push the Coop’s
price down to marginal costs. Therefore, if the Coop possesses a constant-returns-to-scale
technology, the best-reply will be inelastic to all price changes of the PMF.
More specifically, using the utility specification introduced above in (2.6), the FOC of the
Coop manager at the price-setting stage can be written as:
gv
gsm
=
C{l
Csm
+
C{m
Csm
 {l
C{l
Csm
 {m
C{m
Csm
 ({l
C{l
Csm
+ {m
C{m
Csm
) sl
C{l
Csm
 f
C{m
Csm
=
=
C{l
Csm
(+ {l  {m  sl)| {z }
=0
+
C{m
Csm|{z}
=P1@(1P)2
(+ {m  {l| {z }
=sm
 f) = 0=
Hence, the Coop manager in our linear-quadratic setting sets sm = f, i.e. a price equal
to marginal costs. The important point here is that the price-setting behavior becomes
independent of the rival’s price. Consequently, for the profit-maximizing rival the strategic
eect of delegating the price choice to a manager is lost. The price of the Coop cannot be
influenced. Therefore, we can already conclude that the profit-maximizing owners have no
incentive to strategically distort the incentive contract for its manager.10 More formally, the
PMF’s manager chooses sl such that compensation ul is maximized. Solving the first order
condition yields the reaction function
sl(sm) =
++ fl  +
2
+

2
sm.
Solving the system of reaction functions yields the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices
snl =
++ fl  (+ f)
2
> snm = f=
10This is due to our duopoly setting. If rival PMFs are active on the market, there is a strategic incentive
to influence their price choices. Detailed derivations are provided for the triopoly case in the Appendix of
this paper.
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The profit of the PMF is
nl (l) =
(+(1 ) f(l  ))(+(1 ) f(2 l  ))
4(1 2)
=
The owners of the PMF now choose the incentive parameter l to maximize nl . This then
yields
tl = 1>
and shows that the PMF oers a profit-based contract to its manager. This result confirms
our reasoning that the PMF cannot gain from distorting the contract if it competes against a
Coop, quite in contrast to the situation where two PMFs compete (e.g Fershtman and Judd
1987, Sklivas 1987). Using the optimal value of the incentive parameter, we can calculate
the optimal prices
stl =
++ f (+ f)
2
> stm = f>
and the profits and the member value in equilibrium
tl =
(+ f)2(1 )
4(1 + )
> v tm =
(+ f)2(5 + 3)
8(1 + )
>
tm = 0=
3.2. PMF and Coop use incentive contracts. If both firms write incentive contracts,
then the analysis becomes even more interesting. Again, using the utility specification in-
troduced in (2.1), we can consider in detail the price choice of the managers. Rewriting the
incentive-relevant parts of each manager’s compensation un as n +(1 n)f{n, n = l> m, the
first order conditions of a manager at the price-setting stage can be written as
(3.3)
Cn
Csn
+ (1 n)f
C{n
Csn|{z}
=P1@(1P2)
= 0=
Solving the first order conditions leads to the price reaction functions
sl(sm) =
++ fl  +
2
+

2
sm(3.4)
sm(sl) =
++ fm  +
2
+

2
sl>
which shows that they have the usual form and are upward-sloping. Hence, prices are
strategic complements. Although the slope of the reaction functions remains unchanged, the
owners of the firms can use the incentive parameter to shift the reaction function inwards
(n ? 1) or outwards (n A 1) with respect to the case of undistorted, profit-based incentive
contracts (n = 1). Solving (3.4) yields
(3.5) sl =
2+ +  +2 + 2fl + fm
4 2
, sm =
2+ +  +2 + 2fm + fl
4 2
=
Both firms can use the managers as a commitment to increase prices. However, while this
is in the interest of the owners of a PMF (e.g. Fershtman and Judd 1987, Sklivas 1987), the
owners of the Coop try to maximize the welfare of its members. Therefore, they try to keep
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the prices low. These conflicting incentives of the owners can be seen as follows. Write the
prices in (3.5) in the general form sl(l> m) and sm(l> m). Then first focus on the PMF and
write l(sl(l> m)> sm(l> m)) = (sl  f){(sl> sm). The owners of firm l select l such that the
profit l is maximized which yields the first order condition
gl
gl
=
Cl
Csl|{z}
(1Pl)f@(1P2)
Csl
Cl
+
Cl
Csm|{z}
A0
Csm
Cl|{z}
f@(4P2)
where we have used the first order condition (3.3) of the manager in the first term. Since
for l = 1 the first term vanishes, but the second term is positive, the owners can increase
the profit of firm l by choosing a l A 1. Considering the manager’s compensation, this
corresponds to putting a higher weight on profit and a negative weight on sales revenue,
which provides incentives for the manager to keep the price high. Now let us focus on the
Coop. The owners of firm m select the incentive contract for the manager to maximize the
welfare of all members subject to the budget constraint which, as demonstrated above, is
equal to maximizing the objective function v ({l(sl(l> m)> sm(l> m))> {m(sl(l> m)> sm(l> m)))
given in (2.6). The first order condition can be written as
gv
gm
= (
C{l
Csl
Csl
Cm
+
C{l
Csm
Csm
Cm
)(+ {l  {m  sl)| {z }
=0
+
+ [
C{m
Csl
Csl
Cm
+
C{m
Csm
Csm
Cm| {z }
=Pf(2P2)@(1P2)(4P2)
](+ {m  {l| {z }
=sm
 f) 
Csl
Cm|{z}
=f@(4P2)
{l=
Obviously, the first term vanishes. Recall that in the case where the manager is compensated
by a straight salary, the price is set equal to marginal costs, sm = f. In the expression above
this would mean that also the second term vanishes. However, since the third term is
negative and the expression in the brackets is also negative, in the present case where the
Coop manager is compensated by an incentive contract, the price will be below marginal
cost (so that gv@gm = 0 holds). In other words, the Coop manager selects the price point
even more aggressively if an incentive contract is written. The resulting reaction functions
at the contracting stage are given by
l(m) =
+2(2   2) + f(8 62 + 4)
4f(2 2)
+
3
4(2 2)
m
m(l) =
(2 2)f +(1 2)
f
Observe that the Coop’s reaction function is independent of the rival’s choice of contract,
whereas the PMF’s choice depends positively on the other firm’s contract parameter. Solving
the first order condition at the contracting stage yields the following equilibrium bonus rates,
ttl = 1 +
(+ f)2(1 )
4f
 1
ttm =
(2 2)f +(1 2)
f
 1=
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The resulting prices and payos in equilibrium are
sttl =
++ f (+ f)
2
> sttm = f 
(1 )(+ f)
4
>
ttl =
(+ f)2(1 )(2 2)
8(1 + )
> v ttm =
(+ f)2(20 + (12 (1 )))
32(1 + )
>
ttm =  
(+ f)2(1 )(4 + 3)
16(1 + )
=
Note that sttm  f and therefore 
tt
m  0. The Coop uses the manager to set its price under
marginal costs and this results in negative profits.
3.3. The equilibrium of the game. At the first stage the Coop chooses the compensation
structure for its manager. It can either use a straight salary and obtain member value and
profit of
v tm =
(+ f)2(5 + 3)
8(1 + )
and tm = 0>
or use a profit-and-sales-based incentive contract and obtain
v ttm =
(+ f)2(20 + (12 (1 )))
32(1 + )
and ttm =  
(+ f)2(1 )(4 + 3)
16(1 + )
.
Since v ttm ? v
t
m , the owners of the Coop strictly prefer to pay its manager a straight salary
for all  R (0> 1). Note that since ttm ? 0, this conclusion would even hold if the Coop owners
keep an eye on profit. In this equilibrium, the price of the profit-maximizing firm is higher,
stl A s
t
m = f, and consequently the sales of the Coop are higher, {m(s
t
l > s
t
m) A {l(s
t
l > s
t
m). It
turns out that the PMF nevertheless makes a higher profit than the Coop, tl A 
t
m = 0.
These results are also expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For  R (0> 1), the equilibrium outcome of the strategic incentive game
played by a PMF and a Coop can be characterized as follows: (i) the PMF writes a bonus
contract based on profits for its manager (l = 1), whereas the Coop oers its manager a
straight salary; (ii) the PMF charges a higher price (and sells a lower output) than the Coop;
(iii) the PMF also earns a higher profit than the Coop.
Proof. By straightforward manipulation of prices and payos in equilibrium. ¤
In Figure 1 we provide a graphical illustration of the two cases, straight salary versus pay-
for-performance. The lines denoted by stl (sm) and s
t
m(sl) represent the (equilibrium) price
reaction functions of the PMF and the Coop, respectively, in the case where the Coop pays a
straight salary to its manager. Note that the manager sets the Coop’s price equal to marginal
costs independent of the PMF’s price. The intersection point pt of the two lines gives the
optimal price pair. The lines denoted by sttl (sm) and s
tt
m (sl) represent the (equilibrium) price
reaction functions in the case where both firms use incentive contracts. In this case the
optimal price pair is ptt. The figure also shows the iso-profit curves for the PMF (tl and
ttl ) and the iso-utility curves for the Coop (v
t
m and v
tt
m ) in the price space. Note that the
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PMF iso-profit curves have the usual convex shape, whereas the Coop iso-utility curves are
concave. Moreover, note that the profit level is increasing if iso-profit curves are further
away from the origin (tl A 
tt
l ), whereas lower iso-utility curves correspond to higher utility
levels for consumers (v tm A v
tt
m ).
[FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
In the case where the Coop pays a straight salary, the iso-utility curve v tm has a maximum
along the vertical reaction function stm(sl). Likewise, the iso-profit curve 
t
l has a maximum
at the location where it intersects the reaction curve stl (sm) (recall that 
t
l = 1). In the case
where both firms use incentive contracts, this is dierent. To understand this, note that
a manager’s price reaction function only depends on the firm’s own incentive parameter,
but does not depend on the rival’s incentive parameter (see (3.4)). Therefore, in choosing
the contract design for their own manager, the owners of each firm takes the price reaction
function of the rival as given and maximize with respect to their firm’s objective function.
Hence, the owner’s maximization problem is akin to the optimization problem of a Stackel-
berg leader. Consequently, the iso-profit curve ttl and the iso-utility curve v
tt
m are tangent
to the rival’s reaction curves sttm (sl) and s
tt
l (sm), respectively. If both firms use incentive
contracts, the owners use the contracts to manipulate prices in order to reach the most fa-
vorable iso-curve compatible with their rival’s best reply. For the Coop this occurs at a price
level lower than its marginal cost. For the PMF, the selected price coincides with the price
chosen in a situation where the Coop pays a straight salary.
From a practical point of view, it seems surprising that the Coop does not benefit from
using an incentive contract, whereas the PMF does. To understand this better, note that
there is perfect alignment between the goals of the owners and the manager for l = 1 and any
deviation from this value would be made only for strategic reasons. In a Coop, the situation
is dierent. Any explicit incentive contract has to rely on verifiable performance measures
like (e.g.) profit and sales revenue, and this makes it impossible to obtain perfect goal
congruence between the manager and the Coop by selecting the parameter m. In other words,
the incentive contract used for compensating the Coop manager drives a wedge between the
interest of the owners of the Coop and the manager. Consequently, the bonus rate m in a
profit-and-sales-based incentive contract has to balance two goals: first, to align the interests
of the two parties like in an agency setting and, second, to strategically influence the rival’s
price choices. The outcome would change, if the Coop could somehow make the explicit
contract contingent on dierent performance measures like the members’ value (Kopel and
Brand 2012, Barcena-Ruiz 2009). Since this is hard to implement in practice and balancing
the two goals stated above is costly, the Coop prefers to pay its manager a straight salary
and relies on implicit contracts and subjective performance evaluation of its manager.
As a second point for the Coop’s preference for paying a straight salary, observe that the
equilibrium price level of the PMF is identical under both subgames, i.e. stl = s
tt
l . In case
the Coop pays a straight salary to its manager, this price level is obtained as a response
to the Coop manager setting the price equal to marginal costs. In contrast, if the Coop
uses an incentive contract, the manager’s price reaction function is upward-sloping (see (3.4)
and Figure 1). The owners of the Coop now select the incentive parameter m such that the
resulting equilibrium price level of the rival is the same as with fixed compensation. This
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choice of m shifts the manager’s price reaction function inwards (since ttm  1) and causes
a decrease of the Coop’s price below marginal cost. As a consequence, the consumption
bundle of the members of the Coop changes. The demand for the PMF’s product decreases
whereas the demand for the Coop’s product increases. However, overall this results in a
lower member value v ttm (and lower profit).
4. Concluding Remarks
In research and practice it has been a major issue to find the optimal structure of the
compensation package for a firm’s management. Previous work has adopted a shareholder
view and the profit-maximizing motive and has studied optimal incentive contracts which
align the interest of the management with the firm’s shareholders. In recent years the
focus in corporate governance has shifted and researchers are now trying to understand the
relationship between the structure of optimal compensation packages, the characteristics of
a firm, and a firm’s performance (e.g. Matolcsy and Wright 2011, Eldenburg et al. 2004).
For example, recent work has shown that socially concerned firms, enterprises which also
pursue non-profit motives, and other hybrid organizational forms (optimally) compensate
their managers in a dierent way than their profit-maximizing rivals (e.g. Cai et al. 2011,
Frye et al. 2006, Mahoney and Thorn 2005, 2006, Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009, Deckop
et al. 2006). In this paper we have taken a theoretical approach and have presented a
simplified model of strategic incentives for traditional consumer cooperatives competing in
a mixed duopoly against a profit-maximizing firm. Competition was assumed à la Bertrand
and goods were assumed to be dierentiated. The conclusion obtained by our model is
that while for the profit-maximizing firm it is optimal to rely on high-powered incentive
contracts for its manager, for the Coop it is optimal to pay its manager a straight salary.
We believe that our findings are of interest in the light of more recent trends to re-organize
Coop management and to move away from the traditional Coop orientation on member value
to a more investor-focused hybrid Coop structure with a dierent objective (e.g. Katz and
Boland 2002). In such type of organizational structures, the use of incentive contracts of
the type considered here might be more suitable since this type shares some features with a
PMF. We leave this issue as a topic for future research.
5. Appendix
In this appendix we briefly analyze the mixed triopoly case in which two PMFs (denoted
l and k) use strategic incentive contracts while a Coop (firm m) either pays its manager a
flat wage or (like the PMFs) uses a variable bonus scheme. Comparing the payos, we prove
that for the Coop paying a flat wage constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy
of the two-stage game. Moreover, we show that in this equilibrium every PMF selects an
incentive parameter of  A 1 to manipulate the rival PMF’s price upward. We note that the
same result would hold for the case with two Coops and one PMF or with three Coops, but
for brevity we do not report the derivation of the results here. We include the main results
obtained for the case of two PMFs and one Coop in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For  R (0> 1), the equilibrium outcome of the strategic incentive game
played by two PMFs and one Coop can be characterized as follows: (i) the PMFs n = l> k
write a bonus contract for their managers with n A 1, whereas the Coop m oers the manager
a straight salary; (ii) the PMFs charge a higher price (and sells a lower output) than the
Coop; (iii) the PMFs earn a higher profit than the Coop.
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Proof. The direct demands for the three firms (n = l> k> m) competing in prices can be written
as follows
{n(p) =
+ (1 ) (1 + )sn + pPn
(2 + 1) (1 )
>
where p = (sl> sk> sm) and pPn denotes the sum of the prices charged by firm n’s rivals. Let
us first consider the subgame in which the Coop decides to pay the manager a fixed wage.
From Proposition 1 in the main text we know that in this case the Coop will always set a
price equal to the marginal cost, i.e.
sm(sl> sk) = f.
On the other hand, each PMF’s manager (n = l> k) selects the price to maximize compensa-
tion, which yields the following Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices:
snl =
2 (++ f + fl) + + + f (k + 4l) + 2 (3f 3++ fk + 2fl)
(3 + 2) ( + 2)
snk =
2 (++ f + fk) + + + f (l + 4k) + 2 (3f 3++ fl + 2fk)
(3 + 2) ( + 2)
snm = f=
Solving backwards, at the first stage the owners of the n-th PMF maximize the reduced-form
profits
nn (l> k) = (s
n
n ((l> k)) f){n(s
n
l (l> k) > s
n
k (l> k) > s
n
m (l> k))
by selecting the contract parameter n optimally. Solving the first-order conditions simulta-
neously yields
tl = 
t
k =
(4f+ +(2  3) + 2f (5 + 3 + 2)
(6 + 2 + 4) ( + 1) f
 1
for  R [0> 1). Final market prices are given by
stl = s
t
k =
2 (++ f) + 3f (2 + ) 22+
(6 + 2 + 4)
A f
stm = f
and firm payos are
tl = 
t
k =
2 (+ f)2 (4 + 2 + 2) (1 2)
(2 + 1) (6 + 2 + 4)2
A 0
v tm =
(+ f)2 (104 + 1482 + 763 + 114 + 24)
2 (6 + 2 + 4)2 (2 + 1) =
Moreover, for the Coop we have tm = 0.
Now, let us assume that the Coop decides to pay its manager via a variable incentive
scheme. In this case, all three managers set prices to maximize their own compensation. As
a result, the following prices are obtained,
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snl =
+ (2 +   32) + f (2l + 3l +  (k + m) + 2 (l + k + m))
2 (3 + 2)
snk =
+ (2 +   32) + f (2k + 3k +  (l + m) + 2 (l + k + m))
2 (3 + 2)
snm =
+ (2 +   32) + f (2m + 3m +  (l + k) + 2 (l + k + m))
2 (3 + 2)
At the first stage, the two PMFs (n = l> k) and the Coop (n = m) simultaneously determine n
to maximize l (l> k> m), k (l> k> m) and vm (l> k> m) respectively. Solving the first-order
conditions yields the solutions
ttl = 
tt
k =
+ (22  23) + f (4 + 8 + 32 + 33)
( + 2)2 ( + 1) f
 1
ttm =
+ (52 + 73  4 8) + f (8 + 16  63)
( + 2)2 ( + 1) f
 1
for  R (0> 1]. The above expressions show that if there is more than one PMF, each of
the PMFs has an incentive to distort the incentive contract away from pure profit-based
contracts in order to keep the market price high. Final equilibrium prices are
sttl = s
tt
k =
+(1 ) + f(1 + 2)
( + 2)
A f
sttm =
2+(2  ) + f (4 + 6  2)
( + 2)2
? f>
and payos are given by
ttl = 
tt
k =
(+ f)2 (  1) (2  3  2)
(2 + 1) ( + 2)3
v ttm =
(+ f)2 (80 + 862 + 423 + 114 + 24)
2 ( + 2)4 (2 + 1)
Moreover, for the Coop we have
ttm =  
2(+ f)2(1 )(4 + 10 + 52)
( + 2)4 (2 + 1)
? 0=
Considering our mixed price triopoly, a comparison of the Coop payos in the two subgames
reveals that paying a fixed wage instead of a variable bonus scheme for the manager represents
the optimal choice for the Coop, since¡
v tm  v
tt
m
¢
=
(+ f)2 (44 + 322 + 53 + 16) (1 )3
( + 2)4 (6 + 2 + 4)2 (2 + 1)
A 0=
This dierence reaches its maximum for intermediate degrees of product dierentiation .
Moreover, a comparison of the PMF optimal bonus schemes yields
(tl  
tt
l ) =
(+ f) (8 + 2 + 4) (  1)2
( + 2)2 (6 + 2 + 4) ( + 1) f
? 0=
16 MICHAEL KOPEL AND MARCO A. MARINI
Consequently, if the Coop pays its manager a straight salary, both PMFs are less aggressive
when setting the variable incentive scheme for their managers. ¤
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Figure 1 – Best replies and contour lines for both firms if (i) only the PMF adopts an 
incentive contract; (ii) both firms use an incentive contract. 
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